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Which Way To True Justice?-
Appropriate Dispute Resolution
(ADR) and Adversarial Legalism
Adaptation from lectures at the University of Nebraska College of
Law, November 19-20, 2003
Recently, a former law student of mine sent me a book titled Adver-
sarial Legalism: The American Way of Law by Robert A. Kagan, Pro-
fessor of Law and Political Science at the University of California at
Berkeley.1 Professor Kagan gives an insightful analysis and critique
of the American methods of policy implementation and dispute resolu-
tion, which are more adversarial, costly, and legalistic when compared
with systems of other economically advanced countries. He says that
outcomes are often shaped "more by the delays and opportunity costs
of extending adversarial legal processes than by authoritative legal
judgments about the just result."2 He suggests that the American ad-
versarial system springs from fundamental features of American
politics, particularly the propensity to distrust and fragment govern-
ment authority. At the same time, the government is asked to become
more active in providing justice and reducing risks.3
Professor Kagan coined a new term "adversarial legalism," which
means policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution
through lawyer-dominated litigation. It can be distinguished from
other methods of governance and dispute resolution that rely on bu-
reaucratic administration, on discretionary judgment by experts or po-
litical authorities, or on the judge-dominated style of litigation
common in most other countries. 4
Professor Kagan defines adversarial legalism as a method of poli-
cymaking and dispute resolution with two salient characteristics:
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2. Id. at vii.
3. Id. at xi.
4. Id. at 3.
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The first is formal legal contestation-competing interests and disputants
readily invoke legal rights, duties, and procedural requirements, backed by
recourse to formal law enforcement, strong legal penalties, litigation and/or
judicial review. The second is litigant activism-a style of legal contestation
in which the assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments,
and the gathering and submission of evidence are dominated not by judges or
government officials but by disputing parties or interests, acting primarily
through lawyers.5
Adversarial legalism involves decisionmaking institutions with
fragmented authority (for example as between federal, state, and local
governments) and with relatively weak hierarchical control (for exam-
ple where relatively few cases are reviewed). These features lead to a
system which is costly and results in legal uncertainty. 6 With its em-
phasis on individualism, its mistrust of government, its high costs and
penalties, and its response to private claims and special interests, ad-
versarial legalism often provides an unfair method of meeting the
public's demand for justice and protection.
Adversarial legalism generates both social benefits and social
costs. In cases such as the prison reform cases, the desegregation
cases, the mental health reform cases, and the sexual harassment
cases, we are reminded that even the lowest and most despised of citi-
zens, such as convicted felons, feel entitled to petition the court for
relief. Adversarial legalism "encourages Americans, more than re-
sidents of other democracies, to regard themselves as rights-bearing
citizens."'7
However, adversarial legalism, honed by the distrust of authority,
can also produce injustice when invoked against the trustworthy by
the misguided, the mendacious, and the malevolent. In the words of
Professor Kagan:
The complexities and costly delays of adversarial legalism burden commercial
disputes, criminal prosecutions, and rule making by regulatory agencies. Ad-
versarial legalism slows down and imposes large expenses on American
processes for compensating injured people, drawing electoral district lines,
battling discrimination, caring for the mentally ill, choosing labor union repre-
sentatives, preserving wildlife habitats, financing businesses, running hospi-
tals and schools, and cleaning up chemical waste sites. No other country
comes close.8
There are literally thousands of lawyers who believe in or profit
from litigation and use every opportunity to extend it further. Just
consider the United States Superfund program for cleanup of hazard-
ous waste disposal sites. One study noted that by mid-1990, after ten
years of program operation, only sixty-three of the more than twelve
hundred National Priorities List sites had been cleaned up, because
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 30.
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former chemical waste disposers generated so much time-consuming
litigation.9 There also are organized networks of lawyers who focus on
particular hazardous products (e.g., asbestos, tobacco, breast im-
plants, etc.) and organizations, such as those opposed to affirmative
action, that systematically push courts to extend the realm of adver-
sarial legalism.1O
American law professors also have created and defended a body of
legal ethics that exalts adversarial legalism. The codes of ethics in the
United States endorse zealous advocacy of clients' causes, short of dis-
honesty. Zealous advocacy often fails to regard the interests of justice
in the particular case or broader societal concerns." "American law-
yers-unlike British barristers and European lawyers-are trained to
believe that their primary responsibility is not to uncover the truth
and produce the 'correct' legal disposition but to get the best possible
result for the clients."12
Judge Marvin Frankel, formerly a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after leaving the bench, wrote
a scathing indictment of the adversary system in his book Partisan
Justice.13 He declared that it places too low a value on truth-telling.14
Judge Frankel writes: "There are other goods, but the greatest is win-
ning. There are other evils, but scarcely any worse than losing."15 Ex-
plaining other drawbacks to the adversary system, Professor Jerold S.
Auerbach, in his book Justice Without Law, describes it as "a chilling
Hobbesian vision of human nature. It accentuates hostility, not trust.
Selfishness supplants generosity. Truth is shaded by dissembling.
Once an adversarial framework is in place, it supports competitive ag-
gression to the exclusion of reciprocity and empathy."16
With respect to the criminal law, the American political structure,
lacking a Ministry of Justice such as is found in some other developed
democracies, generates more frequent, more punitive, and more unco-
ordinated changes in the criminal law than in other countries. One
consequence is often greater penalties, which in turn lead to more ad-
versarial legalism. One example is my own State of California, where
legislators who faced strong incentives to demonstrate that they were
9. THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMEN-
TATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND 129 (1993).
10. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary In-
quiry, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1994).
11. Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV.
2009 (1990) (reviewing LAWYER IN SOCIETY (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis
eds., 1988 & 1989)).
12. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 244.
13. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 18.
16. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? vii (1983).
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not "soft" on crime and who were supported by "law and order" advo-
cacy groups, passed a sweeping "three strikes and you're out" ballot
initiative in 1994. It mandates life imprisonment for a third felony
conviction, even if the felony is not a violent crime. In Torrance, Cali-
fornia, for example, a twenty-seven-year-old man was sentenced to
twenty-five years to life in prison for his third felony conviction-
stealing a slice of pizza. 17
It has been suggested, among other things, that we should refer a
larger range of criminal prosecutions to less formal, non-jury courts
with greatly reduced penalties. These proceedings could do away with
sometimes extortive plea bargaining. It has also been suggested that
adversarial legalism in jury trials for serious criminal charges would
diminish if American judges, like British judges, were vested with
greater authority to conduct voir dire and assumed a greater role in
questioning witnesses and in summing up the evidence.
18
On the civil side, the relative prominence of private tort actions,
rather than social insurance and other mechanisms, for seeking com-
pensation for personal injury and environmentally-caused illnesses
contrasts the United States with other economically advanced democ-
racies. 19 The United States is also distinctive in the severity of the
legal sanctions available through tort litigation, namely large money
damages. The unpredictability of "lawyer-driven, jury-centered meth-
ods of adjudication" is another distinction.20 Moreover, the United
States has a wider array of litigation-encouraging procedures such as
contingency fees to finance tort litigation, extensive lawyer-controlled
pretrial discovery, large class actions, and the rule that losing liti-
gants need not pay the winners' legal fees. 2 1 Some studies suggest
that many lawyers engage in super-aggressive, manipulative lawyer-
ing explicitly designed to increase the other side's litigation costs-
and, thereby induce it to compromise its claims or defenses. 22 Equal-
ity of parties' wealth and motivation are unlikely in most cases.23 It is
rare to observe lawyers of equal competence and resources in a given
case. In class action litigation, the settlement often benefits the attor-
neys more than the class. 24
With respect to social justice, adversarial legalism has sometimes
brought heroic results. One such success was reducing blatant forms
of discrimination. However, it has failed to provide a nationally uni-
17. Fox Butterfield, '3 Strikes' Law in California Is Clogging Courts and Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, March 23, 1995, at Al, Bll.
18. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 234.
19. Id. at 127.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id. at 121.
24. Id. at 120.
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form, broad-based regime of social and health insurance, public hous-
ing, employee benefits, and the like.25
With respect to government regulation, United States public policy
is quite formal and open to interest group participation. It is adver-
sarial and subject to judicial review.26 It is inefficient and inflexible
in comparison to other economically developed countries, because it
undermines the kind of government and business cooperation neces-
sary to answer the public's needs. 2 7
While adversarial legalism can result in improved public policy, it
can also result in extorting particular benefits. Additionally, political
responsiveness can be skewed in favor of intense political factions.28
For instance, in an environmental case in California, the threat of liti-
gation not only enabled a particular group to win a seat at the bar-
gaining table, but it also gave the group enough leverage to demand
and obtain its preferred "environmental mitigation" measure. In or-
der to break free of a lawsuit that had blocked a proposed pipeline
from central California to Los Angeles refineries, an oil company
agreed to a plan to pump oil two hundred miles north to San Francisco
and then ship it by ocean tanker to Los Angeles, thereby tripling the
risk of oil spills from tanker operations. 2 9
Suggestions for improving the civil justice system are many and
include: extending social insurance for such things as health and disa-
bility claims; extending no-fault insurance for motor vehicle claims;
having more informal tribunals such as small claims courts, which re-
duce delay in hearings and cost; determining the circumstances under
which the loser in a lawsuit might be required to pay attorney's fees
while not chilling appropriate lawsuits; letting all participants af-
fected by the regulation of industry, labor, the environment, and the
like participate in policy through use of qualified groups consulting
regularly with government instead of through litigation or threat of
appeal. 30
While there are certainly many virtues to adversarial legalism, it
has serious deficiencies as a system for meeting the day-to-day chal-
lenge of providing justice in contemporary society. In addition to the
suggestions already commented upon, Appropriate Dispute Resolu-
tion-ADR (sometimes referred to as Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion)-is one way out of excessive adversarial legalism. By ADR, I am
referring to processes such as: negotiation; early neutral evaluation,
where a neutral third person evaluates a case's worth before trial; me-
25. Id. at 175.
26. Id. at 188.
27. Id. at 182.
28. Id. at 224.
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id. at 235-41.
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diation, where a neutral third person helps the parties to arrive at a
mutually agreeable solution; and arbitration, where a neutral third
person is selected to resolve a dispute.
The critics of ADR have focused on the issue of adjudication versus
settlement through ADR. They include Professor Owen Fiss, whose
heroic view of adjudication is revealed by saying: "[w]hen one sees in-
justices that cry out for correction. . . . Someone has to confront the
betrayal of our deepest ideals and be prepared to turn the world up-
side down to bring those ideals to fruition."3 1 Others have questioned
whether informal processes are unfair to disempowered and subordi-
nated groups.3 2 Still others have suggested that too much settlement
decentralizes dispute resolution and the making of public law. 33 How-
ever, I agree with Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow:
[T]he question is not "for or against" settlement (since settlement has become
the "norm" for our system), but when, how, and under what circumstances
should cases be settled? When do our legal system, our citizenry, and the par-
ties in particular disputes need formal legal adjudication, and when are their
respective interests served by settlement, whether public or private?
3 4
Let me offer two examples. In March of 1985, I arrived in New
Delhi, India, to begin a visit sponsored by the United States Depart-
ment of State to speak to law associations and university students
about our American justice system. This was just a few months after
the Union Carbide disaster at a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India.
Thousands of persons were killed or injured in the worst industrial
accident in history. When I arrived at the airport, I was met by a
group of reporters who had interviewed a San Francisco lawyer the
week before. When asked by the reporters why he had come, he re-
plied "M-O-N-E-Y," spelling out the word. He went on to explain that
these victims had received serious injuries and deserved the large
amounts of damages he could get for them by suing Union Carbide in
the United States. The reporters asked me: "Judge, what would you
do to resolve the cases of the Bhopal victims?" I replied that I would
follow the procedure adopted by the European Commission on Human
Rights. First, I would establish an international factfinding commis-
sion to undertake a thorough investigation of the facts and to deter-
mine what the issues were. Second, I would attempt a friendly
settlement with all of the parties concerned. If this failed, I would
refer the case to arbitration or to the European Court on Human
Rights. Later, the State Department handed me literally hundreds of
31. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086-87 (1984).
32. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359.
33. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Pro-
cess, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631.
34. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Dem-
ocratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2664-65 (1995).
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clippings from Indian newspapers saying in one way or another: "Me-
diation for Bhopal says U.S. Judge." This demonstrated to me that
the people of India, as in the United States, are crying for a faster, less
painful, and better way to resolve disputes.
This case exemplifies why much of the conventional wisdom under-
lying litigation strategy and lawyering in general needs to be ex-
amined in light of incorporating ADR into the pretrial process.
Lawyers and other providers can utilize ADR to expand the parties'
tools for dealing with the psychological, social, and economic dynamics
that drive litigation. Their role should be that of constructive
problemsolvers and peacemakers rather than zealous advocates.
They should tailor the approach in each case to the context in which it
evolves, with particular attention to the cultural forces at work.
For instance, in the Bhopal incident, rather than the millions of
dollars promised, which have yet to be delivered to the clients of the
San Francisco lawyer, most potential litigants would have been satis-
fied with death costs plus a $500 per year annuity for family members
of those who did not survive. This would be in addition to health care
for those who were injured. If all of the parties had been given a voice
and had been heard by a nonpartisan neutral who was acceptable and
accountable to all, the end result would probably have been much
fairer and more productive. The lawyer, as a problemsolver, must ex-
amine the true needs and interests of those involved in a dispute,
rather than looking only to the parties' legal positions.
My second example comes from my trip to Israel. I was on sabbati-
cal leave to study the laws of marriage and divorce as administered by
different religious groups: the Jews in the Rabbinical courts, the
Christians in the Christian courts, the Muslims in the Sharia courts,
and the Baha'is through their administrative system. In Akka, I at-
tended a hearing conducted by three Greek Orthodox priests with long
white beards and in long black robes. Court was conducted in a Quon-
set hut with paint peeling from the walls. It was furnished only with a
plain wooden table and chairs. A wife was suing her husband for di-
vorce. As her lawyer rose to his feet with a handful of papers from
which to plead her case, the presiding priest gently waived him aside.
The priest turned to the wife and asked her to tell her own story. She
explained that for five years of marriage she has shared a house with
her mother-in-law. The older woman, too old to climb stairs, occupied
the ground floor and the wife lived upstairs. Since there was only one
entrance to the house, the wife had to enter through her mother-in-
law's living quarters to get to her own. Her mother-in-law continually
questioned her about her activities and offered unsolicited advice.
The wife said she loved her husband but the situation was intolerable.
The wife sat down. Then the presiding priest, waving aside the hus-
band's lawyer as he had the wife's, asked to hear the husband's side of
2004]
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the case. The husband said that he loved his wife but also loved his
mother. As a Christian, he felt responsibility for both, but he was a
poor man and could not afford two households.
The three priests retired by stepping into a dusty street outside
and then returned five minutes later with their judgment. The hus-
band was to build a ladder. When the wife wanted to avoid her
mother-in-law, she could climb the ladder to her second floor window.
As I watched the husband and wife leave the Quonset hut hand-in-
hand, I could only wonder what might have happened to this couple in
the Los Angeles Family Court with its adversary system, its orders to
show cause, and its high attorney's fees. A binary or win/loss solution
could have produced a solution but would not have served the parties'
real interests. Non-binary solutions may produce more justice and al-
low the parties to craft solutions with a greater variety of remedial
possibilities for complex social and legal problems. 35 These problems
need intricate, not -binary solutions. Although judges provided the
remedy in this case, it was the type of remedy that might have
emerged from a mediation.
One objection to negotiated settlements is that they are unprinci-
pled because negotiators and mediators do not look to legal principles
as the basis for settling disputes. Others argue that settlements are
in fact rule- and norm-based. 36 They are also norm-creating and
made in the "shadow of the law," a term coined by Professors Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser to describe divorce negotiation. 3 7 Re-
peat play arbitrations and mediations are sensitive not only to the
"norms" created by numerous repeat cases but increasingly to pub-
lished reports of settlements in important "public" cases, including
mass tort and consumer class actions. The breast implant38 and as-
bestos 39 cases are good examples.
Even if not legally-based, negotiated settlements are principle-
based. Parties may have a wide variety of interests in a given case, of
which legal principles may be just one set. They may decide that so-
cial, psychological, economic, political, or religious principles should
govern. This does not mean that such dispute resolution is not princi-
pled-it is just not law-principled.40
35. Id. at 2674.
36. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Set-
tlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976).
37. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
38. See David R. Olmos & Henry Weinstein, Breast Implant Settlement in Peril, L.A.
TIMES, May 5, 1995, at 1.
39. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83
F.3d 610 (1996).
40. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 2677.
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Moreover, dispute resolution, such as settlement, serves an impor-
tant critical and democratic function. In the words of Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, it "serves to criticize, avoid or correct laws that some
find unjust, inefficient, or just plain inapplicable."4 1 Thus, people may
choose settlement because legislatively enacted law fails to meet the
underlying needs or interests of parties in particular cases. 42 Profes-
sor Menkel-Meadow gives the example of joint custody in divorce
cases, which began as a settlement "compromise" to the draconian and
severe effects of single physical custody.43 It was later enacted into
law. Therefore, settlement, with its occasional rejection of law, can be
seen as a democratic expression of individual justice whenever rules
made for the aggregate would either be unjust or simply irrelevant to
the achievement of justice in individual cases.44
Some argue against private settlement because of its secrecy.
They assume that only defendants, such as those in products liability
litigation, want to keep information secret. In fact, many types of
plaintiffs, such as those suing for sexual harassment, defamation, and
employment cases, have strong interests in not publicizing the under-
lying facts of their cases.4 5 But, to the extent that a good settlement
requires the revelation of nonlegally relevant facts, nonprivate settle-
ment processes will severely limit the willingness of parties to settle
cases for nonlegal factors.4 6 These factors include emotional needs
and motives, future business needs, financial data, trade secrets, psy-
chological and social issues such as risk aversion, and precedential ef-
fects for other employees or family members.
With respect to court-annexed ADR, some judges, lawyers, and
court administrators suggest that we must continue to mine the ad-
vantages of settlement for caseload reduction. 47 Reducing costs and
delay through increased efficiency appear to be the values that ac-
count for much of the courts' interest in the ADR process. 48 While
these values are important, the potential for creative solutions and
41. Id. at 2676.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2684.
46. Id.
47. See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 87 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the
Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994).
48. DONNA STEINSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A
STUDY OF THE FivE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997).
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the ability of parties to participate in the outcomes should not be un-
derestimated.49 Other values include:
increasing the rationality, the fairness, and the civility of the disputing pro-
cess; expanding the information base on which parties make key decisions in
litigation and settlement; reducing parties' alienation from the justice system;
expanding parties' opportunities to act constructively and creatively; helping
parties understand and vent emotions; and expanding the parties' tools for
dealing with the psychological, social, and economic dynamics that accompany
and sometimes drive litigation. 50
The purpose of court-annexed ADR should not be defined as permit-
ting courts to unburden themselves of unwanted classes of cases. Its
purpose is not to make life easier for judges and administrators by
eliminating cases but to provide respect for the courts by providing
dispute resolution tools that really give the parties an opportunity,
successful or not, to try to solve their problems with some help from
the neutral third party provided by the court.5 1
In sum, ADR allows parties to decide how they want their disputes
to be resolved. They can, with the help of their lawyers, use either
private or court-annexed ADR, depending on how much public dis-
course or confidentiality they need and how much consultation or di-
rect confrontation they want with the other side. As Professor
Menkel-Meadow suggests: "If settlements do not track the law be-
cause other interests are more important to the parties, then we
should not intrude upon private settlement, unless that settlement vi-
olates a law of public importance."52
Critical questions remain, such as: when and how should settle-
ments become public? And what scrutiny should be given to them?
Professor Menkel-Meadow suggests that there are some measures
when review is appropriate: first, when the parties seek court impri-
matur and approval; second, in the case of class action settlements
requiring court approval under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e),
which requires courts to engage in some scrutiny of the adequacy of
counsel and the reasonableness of settlement;53 and third, when a
case so implicates the interests of those beyond the "dispute" that
some "public" exposure may be a necessary part of our democratic pro-
cess, such as mass tort cases. 5 4 The difficult question that remains to
be explored is what should happen when the parties consent to a pri-
49. Linda R. Singer, Future Looks Bright, but Challenges Include Retaining Our Core
Values, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 29.
50. Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current Status and the
Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 11, 37-38.
51. Dorothy W. Nelson, ADR in the Federal Courts-One Judge's Perspective: Issues
and Challenges Facing Judges, Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public,
17 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 10 (2001).
52. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 2694.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
54. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 2695.
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vate settlement-and a third party seeks to disrupt party consent be-
cause of interests the negotiating parties may have chosen to avoid or
ignore. 55
Finally, it is clear to me that with the proliferation of new tech-
niques for ADR, there is a need to educate and train more justice-pro-
ducing persons. Next to the Federal Courthouse in Pasadena is a non-
profit corporation called the Western Justice Center Foundation. Its
purpose is to promote the peaceful resolution of conflict. It identifies
and evaluates models of conflict resolution in the schools, the commu-
nity, and the courts.56 It has been working with elementary schools,
primarily with children in the fourth and fifth grades who receive peer
mediation training and serve as peer mediators in their schools. The
reward for the children who serve as peer mediators during the semes-
ter is to come to the Pasadena courthouse and meet with a federal
judge, usually me. They recount their experiences and then litigate
and mediate a case (with the help of the judge and their teacher).
The case they have recently "litigated" involves a suit against a
teacher who has given a child an "F" when the child feels she deserves
at least a "C." In one instance, one fifth-grader represented the child,
another represented the teacher, and three were selected to serve as
judges. They were told to make up the best possible case for their
clients. "May it please the Court," said the "lawyer" for the child, "My
client got an 'F' because the teacher is a racist." The "lawyer" for the
teacher replied with: "The teacher gave the right grade, because the
child comes to school, doesn't do her homework, and falls asleep
in class." The "lawyer" for the child responded with: "The child falls
asleep in class because she comes to school without breakfast." The
judges decide who "wins" with the help of the associate judges who are
the other members of the class.
Then the same disputants mediate the case. They use the skills
they have been taught such as setting the stage, introducing them-
selves, defining the problem, identifying the problem using active lis-
tening skills, finding solutions, and coming to agreement. In this most
recent case, the fifth-graders decided that the teacher should stay af-
ter school to help the child earn at least a "C" and thereby prove that
the teacher was not a racist. In addition, somebody should write to
the school P.T.A. and tell them that kids were coming to school with-
out breakfast. They had other solutions, but what pleased me most
was at the end they hugged each other. This was a make-believe case,
but the children had identified the facts, determined what the issues
were, and came up with solutions. There were no winners and losers.
Instead everyone won. Even more touching to me was a thank you
55. Id. at 2696.
56. See Western Justice Center Foundation website, at http://www.westernjustice.
org (last visited May 7, 2004).
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note I received from a student named Herbie. He wrote: "Dear Judge
Nelson. Thank you so much for teaching us more about mediation.
But why don't you teach it to adults too, so we won't have war
anymore?"
The law schools have an important part to play in teaching their
students about ADR as well as adversarial legalism. Derek Bok, for-
mer Dean of the Harvard Law School and former President of Harvard
University, wrote in 1982:
[L]aw schools train their students more for conflict than for the gentler arts of
reconciliation and accommodation .... Over the next generation, I predict,
society's greatest opportunities will lie in tapping human inclinations toward
collaboration ... rather than stirring our proclivities for competition and ri-
valry. If lawyers are not leaders in marshaling cooperation and designing
mechanisms that allow it to flourish, they will not be at the center of the most
creative social experiments of our time.
5 7
Finally, it should be understood that the challenge is to determine
whether adversarial legalism or some other appropriate form of dis-
pute resolution will provide the right process, the right remedy, and
the fairest and most just result in a given case.
57. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System, Haiv. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38, 45.
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